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12 A Preliminary Phenomenology
of the Audiobook
D. E. Wittkower

Philosophy has been called “a radical asking of the common questions of
everyday.”1 Here, our object of inquiry is not one as fundamental to experience as those typical of philosophical inquiry, and our question not quite
so common or everyday. Rather than radicalizing general questions such as
“What is that?” “Who are you?” or “What time is it?” we will instead ask
two interconnected questions:
• What is it like to listen to an audiobook?
• What are we listening to when we listen to an audiobook?
Before turning to the experience of listening to an audiobook, it is worth
making a few preparatory notes on the material conditions necessary for
the possibility of this experience. Wired or wireless, the audiobook can
reach us only through our involvement in a larger technical system, both
in the preparation of the experience in question and in the circumstances
of the experience itself. The preparation necessary for the possibility of the
experience, completed within a larger technical system, may differ in each
instance, but a typical preparation might include obtaining an audiobook
on CD or through download, adding the audio files to a digital library on
a desktop computer, adding the fi les within a playlist synced to an MP3
player, and updating the MP3 audio library. The circumstances necessary
for the possibility of the experience itself will differ as well but invariably
include integration in one of a number of larger technical systems, such as
listening to the audiobook on a car stereo while driving, on a home stereo
while performing domestic tasks, or on an MP3 player while walking or
at the gym.
We must also note that the activity is neither isolated nor all-consuming:
in fact, if we are to understand the experience of listening to an audiobook,
we should not assume that the convergence of intermixed and simultaneous
activities has no bearing on the phenomenology of listening, or that coincident activities would not have different effects on the experience. Thus, in a
full phenomenology of the audiobook, we would have to consider listening
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as an experience sufficiently situated and specific to be attuned to the influence of convergent activities but general enough to be able to provide a resonant shared notion of a ‘what it’s like’ for audiobook listening.2 This most
general understanding of the experience of audiobook listening exhibits
many distinct although interrelated movements:
1. The audiobook is a temporal object of experience;
2. The audiobook is spoken;
3. The audiobook has a speaker;
4. The audiobook is started, stopped, and restarted;
5. The audiobook forms a context of physical and social experience.
Owing to space limitations, I will concentrate in this chapter on the audiobook as a temporal object of experience, as this is directly relevant to phenomenological discussions of aural experiences originating with Edmund
Husserl. The remaining movements will then be addressed more briefly,
and the reader welcomed to consider these commentaries as spurs, notes,
or proposals for future research.
1. THE AUDIOBOOK IS A TEMPORAL
OBJECT OF EXPERIENCE
The audiobook is audible and auditory. This will obviously distinguish it
from the written work of which it is a performance, and the specific timeboundedness of the auditory object must be addressed in order to make
sense of what we are listening to when we listen to an audiobook. At the
same time, while we will compare the audiobook to previously theorized
auditory objects of experience, such as music or the speech of a present
other, we must distinguish it from these other objects as well.
“All sensation takes place in time,” Walter Ong has noted, “but sound
has a special relationship to time. . . . There is no way to stop sound and
have sound. I can stop a moving picture camera and hold one frame fi xed
on the screen. If I stop the movement of sound, I have nothing.”3 Even the
film, though, does not really exist as an object of experience within its still
frames but is essentially in the movement and flow from one moment to the
next. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty put it, “[A] film as a perceptual object . . .
is not a sum total of images but a temporal gestalt,”4 and the perception of
its “movement,” as with the perception of a melody rather than individual
notes, is really the primary and fundamental content of our experience of
these objects:
melody does not perceptibly change when transposed, that is, when all
its notes are changed while their interrelationships and the structure of
the whole remain the same. On the other hand, just one single change
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in these interrelationships will be enough to modify the entire make-up
of the melody. Such a perception of the whole is more natural and more
primary than the perception of isolated elements.5
So too, as Don Ihde has put it, “[W]hen I listen to someone speak, I do not
ordinarily hear a syllable at a time, or even a word, but I hear the larger
melody and flow of speech as an ongoing rhythmic unity.”6 The auditory
speech-object is the process of movement between sounds and phonemes.
Hence a fuller discussion of how we hear a melody rather than individual
notes will allow us to give a “close listening” to the experience of hearing a
sentence rather than tones, consonants, and phonemes.

How We Hear a Melody
Each particular sound—say, the note of middle C—is physically present
only while it is being actively created by the vibration of the instrument or
speaker system. As we experience the C followed by an F, and then a G, a C
major tonality is established in the melody. Should the G be followed by a B,
we would experience the B as leaning upward toward a return to the tonic,
while, had we simply heard a B in isolation, we would experience no such
tension. Furthermore, in order to have an experience of the B as a leading
tone, we must not merely remember the preceding tones but must continue
to feel them as well—but we must feel them as present under erasure for, as
John Brough points out, “a melody, whose successive notes were heard all at
once as now, would not appear as a melody at all, but as a crash of simultaneous sound.”7 No longer foreground but not yet absent to perception, the
notes that are no longer physically present to the eardrum must be phenomenally present to the listener in order to form the background against which
the primary impression of the sounding note appears. It is only this presenceundererasure of the absent which makes it possible to hear a melody rather
than a series of mere tones or a clashing cacaphonic muddle.
Husserl describes this as retention—sharply distinguished from memory. Retention is a kind of primary remembrance in which we maintain
what just was as a continuing presence to experience, which relativizes the
ongoing primary perception of the senses. Memory as we usually use the
term is not the presence of a still-perceived ‘just-having-been,’ but rather
a prior ‘now’ which appears to us only through our recall of it—in Husserl’s words, “not perceived, i.e. self-given, but presentified.”8 Perception
of objects—such as the melody—which appear in several parts, only one of
which is primally present at any moment, requires retention, not memory.
Merleau-Ponty makes the same point in a different way:
If the past were available to us only in the form of express recollections, we should be continually tempted to recall it in order to verify
its existence . . . whereas in fact we feel it behind us as an incontestable acquisition.9
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The presence of a perceived object of experience includes, in addition to a
‘now’ and a ‘just-having-been,’ a primordial unity with a future as a ‘justabout-to-be.’ In the prior example, the experience of the B as a leading tone
requires not only a felt carrying-along of the ‘just-having-been’ but also
a projective hearing in which the C that is not heard is experienced in its
absence within our hearing of the B. The presence to experience of the B as
a tone pushing us toward a return to the home tone of C is constructed by
the presence of the having-just-been but consists of the presence to experience of the just-about-to-be: the C which is not heard, or which is ‘heard’
as not-yet-present. In harmonies this is felt even more clearly: the movement I–IV–V–VI7 is experienced as a false resolution precisely because the
VI7 chord is heard as superimposed against the tonic chord established by
the dominant chord as an expectation. The VI7 chord sounds false to the
ear not upon reflection or as an intellectual judgment, but rather it is felt
as false from the moment the tones sound because it is heard as failing to
match up with the tonic chord present to experience at that moment as the
anticipated resolution that we are precisely not listening to. This presence
in the ‘now’ of an expected future is discussed by Husserl as protention and
is the futural equivalent of retention, as Thomas Clifton has explained:
Protention is the term for a future which we anticipate, and not merely
await. Awaiting, like recollection, implies a disengagement from the
present, whereas, experientially, the now which we perceive is colored
by the way we intend the future. Intending a future with respect to a
given event means to attach significance to that event in proportion
to the way the present and future are attached to, yet distinguishable
from, each other.10
In listening to speech, too, we certainly do not merely await to hear what
words will “arrive” next but instead actively intend the future in modified
ways from one phoneme to the next. This is clearly the case when listening
to the speech of a present other, as the future is projected forth by context,
relationship, body language, and so forth, but this structure of active anticipation and construction of meaning is also present in a full and vibrant way
while listening to recorded speech. As we will see, when we listen to the
audiobook, we hear every word as along with the words that have been and
as against the words that could have been, just as surely as, in the melody,
we hear each note with the notes which preceded it and against the notes
which might have followed.

How We Hear a Sentence
Processes of retention and protention are necessary for the listener’s comprehension of the spoken word: each new phoneme is heard as relativized
by the phonemes preceding it and construct for us a protended anticipation of the words likely to follow. The adjective alerts the listener to a

Rubery 1st pages.indd 219

T&F Proofs: Not For Distribution

12/8/2010 8:56:09 AM

220 D. E. Wittkower
substantive to follow; the pronoun projects forward a verb. The listener
actively constructs the meaning of sentences as the phonemes are sounded
and replace one another through time: in order for the subject to be heard
as the subject, the listener must hear it along with the not-yet-presence of
the predicate which it, as subject, implies will follow. The predicate only
appears to the listener as a predicate insofar as the listener retains the subject of the sentence as the just-having-been, which is the background upon
which the predicate appears; the predication of the predicate inheres in the
absent presence of the retained subject.
All of this is true of the written word as well but in differing ways. The
written word is put into motion, so to speak, by the action of the reader.
The reader moves forward across the page, replacing the phonemes present
within the ‘now’ of the inner voice at her own pace, circling back to reread
as necessary. The spoken word, when containing clauses and conditionals,
must be heard by the listener as a series of related points, each of which
must be retained by her and actively reconstructed as the succession of phonemes continue to bring further meaning to earlier components. Consider
this sentence as it would have to be understood if spoken:
Consider (imperative action, protends an object) this (protention prolonged: what is it?) sentence (protended object supplied; imperative
must be retained in order to contextualize the intended encounter of
this object) as (modifies retained imperative action “consider”) it (pronoun calling for retention of substantive “this sentence”) would (clarifies retained modification “as” of retained imperative “consider”—the
listener now knows we are going to consider the sentence “as” something in some counterfactual form yet to be determined) have (the
listener hears /æ/ rather than /ԥ/, signaling that this “have” does not
primarily modify the “would”—as in the spoken “would’ve,” which
uses a schwa—but will instead modify something which is to follow. If
the speaker is American, this word will be pronounced /hæf/, indicating that this “have” is not the “have” of possession, which is /hæv/ in
both UK and US English, but will instead form the idiomatic “have
to” of necessitation) to (with retained “have” forms idiom of necessitation, protending a subject to be necessitated yet to be determined) be
(infi nitive verb fragment, the listener must still wait for more context)
understood (that which is necessitated by the “have to” is supplied, and
the retained phrases “have to” and “to be” can now be used to connect
supplied content “understood” with object “sentence” under imperative
“consider”) if (indicates that the specific nature of counterfactualism,
implied previously by “would,” will now be supplied) spoken (retained
sentence now placed under counterfactual conditional supplied).
Protention and retention are both different from conscious or intentional
recall and expectation, and this breakdown of the process of listening is not
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meant to represent the self-aware movements of the mind but instead meant
to clarify and make present to awareness the unnoticed and unreflective
process of structured listening and active contextualization which makes
understanding possible. This structured listening constructs a number of
simultaneous timelines. The subject is given, protending a predicate. But
then, a modifying clause is given to the subject, and we must maintain
our protention of predication while modifying the retained subject. Having
circled back, we may again move forward in the construction of meaning.
As each word replaces the last in the succession of ‘nows,’ we construct
the meaning of the sentence through a nonlinear cycle of emerging protentions which are variously resolved into the retained content, and the overall
meaning of the sentence emerges out of the circling back of elements upon
one another, as we might see water as flowing downstream even though it
does so through a complex and meandering process of moving up, down,
and backward through ripples and eddies on the surface.
2. THE AUDIOBOOK IS SPOKEN
In the written word, the particular modes of relevance of one word upon
another are not communicated through grammatical roles alone but also
take place through the occult actions of punctuation marks. In the spoken
word, similar signals are given through precisely timed pauses and changes
in tone. The commas used to offset modifying or explanatory clauses, such
as those surrounding this aside, are intended to be heard differently, and to
construct meaning differently, than those within a list. The colon indicates
content: that which follows it loops back upon and superimposes on that
which precedes it. The modifying or explanatory clause—set off by commas or em dashes, like this—is lowered in pitch relative to the primary
“timeline” of the sentence. Some words are emphasized in volume or enunciation in order to signal to the listener that these words are essential to the
retrospective reconstruction of the meaning of the sentence in question.
Words in subordinate clauses and noun phrases are run together subtly in
order to indicate their unification as objects distinct from other “moving
parts” within the overall claim. Parentheticals are uttered sotto voce (at
half voice, like this).
Punctuation marks may seem far clearer than the pauses and vocal
modulations of the spoken word, but it is not obvious that they have specifiable meaning. It seems just as likely that they notify us simply that something is supposed to happen at a given point in the sentence, and—like
“reading” vowels in Hebrew—the reader is depended on to be able to tell
based on context what is supposed to be happening. Today’s punctuation
usages are formalized and do not always track the rhythms which lend
speech its intelligibility. Turning back to earlier forms of written English,
we can see punctuation which is less a formal feature of writing and more

Rubery 1st pages.indd 221

T&F Proofs: Not For Distribution

12/8/2010 8:56:09 AM

222 D. E. Wittkower
an encoding of speech. For example, consider a passage from John Stuart
Mill’s Utilitarianism:
Against this doctrine [the Greatest Happiness Principle], however,
arises another class of objectors, who say that happiness, in any form,
cannot be the rational purpose of human life and action; because, in
the fi rst place, it is unattainable: and they contemptuously ask, what
right hast thou to be happy? a question which Mr. Carlyle clenches by
the addition, What right, a short time ago, hadst thou even to be?11
Whereas this passage closely tracks the affordances of speech in aiding the
listener’s active construction of meaning, it is still clearly composed and far
different from speech as extemporaneously spoken.
~To speak with someone, that is, to speak with a particular, well to
speak in the way that we really do talk most of the time, requires that
there’s a lot of back and forth and often (well, I do this—you probably do
too), if you really pay attention to what someone says, we’ll start a sentence
three or four times before finishing it. And then start back up in the middle
again! And when the speaker moves on from one point to another without
fi nishing the fi rst thought, maybe we know where she was going, or, if
we don’t, we forget about it because we’re concerned with communicating
with the person in front of us! The words are just a means to that end, and
if there are a few loose ends at the end, who cares! (—and plus, there’s no
evidence, right?) Spoken words move their cargo like ants pulling along a
bit of bread: the ants fall down, some drop it, others keep going, some peel
off to go do something else, and some of them push it the wrong way, and
little by little, the bread moves on down the line.~
The written word is fully available to the reader,12 to be engaged with at
her own pace and in the order and level of care that she prefers. The spatial
presentation of writing allows for a nonlinear visual encounter because
space, unlike the successive presentation of time, contains and co-presents
its elements. The reader may circle back, repeat, review. And so, in contrast
to the way spoken word functions between present conversationalists, a
written thought must be completed and consistent before it is expressed.
In between the starting and stopping of playback, the audiobook follows
its own rhythm and pace in a context-insensitive and user-independent way.
Listening to an audiobook is not like listening to a person speak—persons
speaking to persons make eye contact, pause to invite signs that the listener
is paying attention, use body language to emphasize or change meanings,
and um and hem and haw. The audiobook proceeds at the same inexorable
rate while the audience drifts in and out of attention.
(Please read this paragraph backward from the end.) .paragraph this in
simulate to tried have I which experience this is It .something missed we’ve
fi nd we if sentence the of beginning the to back look simply cannot we
because ,end the at together all it piece to passed just has what of enough
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remember to working actively ,procession their on carry words the while
on going is what out work to attempt must We .sound of nature momentary
the of difficulty inherent the exacerbates understanding and meaning create
to take-and-give interpersonal the use to inability This .needed when back
circle and listener the to respond to ability the without ,relentlessly forward
continues narrator The .language written or spoken either of affordances
the of many lacks audiobook The
The audiobook, as an audio performance of the written word, contains
the determinate and preconsidered meaningfulness of the written word but
without the affordance of nonlinear options for reader engagement. However, the richness of human speech seems to be sufficient compensation to
support comprehension, even without the give-and-take of listening to a
present other. Not only are the guiding rhythms of speech reintroduced,
substituting for punctuation marks—their pale written equivalent—but
additionally every word is made replete with meaning through its intonation. As Ihde has observed,
For the reader who comes upon the word on a page, the field and its
unsaid significance is a dark obscurity. . . . But if this word is spoken,
there is already a certain potential field and presence of unsaid significance in the voice. If “Adam” is said in an angry voice, imploringly, or
in a quiet whisper, each sounded presence allows the “bare word” to
emerge from some of its obscurity in the sounding of its presence.13
Similar to Heidegger’s observation that Dasein always fi nds itself having
a mood (Stimmung), we may observe that the voice always has some kind
of attunement. Just as “the pallid, evenly balanced lack of mood . . . is far
from nothing at all,” so too is the word spoken with no inflection and a flat
affect just as full of meaning in its performance as if spoken animatedly.14
The voice cannot but carry with it an emotional component, even when
that component is emotionlessness. Marshall McLuhan noted that “[t]here
are not many ways of writing ‘tonight,’ but Stanislavsky used to ask his
young actors to pronounce and stress it fifty different ways. . . . The written word spells out in sequence what is quick and implicit in the spoken
word.”15 The audiobook, although it contains this narrative description of
what is emotively present in the spoken word, contains the replete modulations of the spoken word as well.
The pause, too, plays a great role in aiding the construction of meaning. The pause can function as a grammatical marker, signaling when to
bind together meanings with preceding substantives, or when to expect
further conditionals, modifiers, actions, and so forth. Pauses serve not only
as signals to engage in these forms of synthesis and expectation but also
as opportunities to do so. When the narrator moves along too quickly, or
without suitably lengthy pauses at constitutive interstices, we very easily
become confused and fall behind. The longer pauses which come at the end
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of sentences, paragraphs, or sections serve a similar role, except that they
signal the completion of a larger process of construction and provide the
opportunity for the listener to bind together a larger set of meanings. As
Husserl points out, these fi nial pauses are not experienced as silence:
One speaks of the dying or fading away etc., of the content of sensation
when veritable perception passes over into retention. Now, according
to the statements made hitherto, it is already clear that the retentional
“content” is, in the primordial sense, no content at all. . . . The retentional sound is not actually present but “primarily remembered”
precisely in the now.16
Consider the natural pause which occurs at the end of a classical performance. It is surely possible for an audience member to applaud too soon,
but this rarely occurs. Instead, the audience members seem on the whole to
have an agreement about when the pause necessary to the piece has elapsed,
or they simply await the downward return of the conductor’s baton. The
duration of this pause is rightly regarded as a part of the composition, for
applause too early is heard as an interruption despite the fact that sound
is no longer being produced. Without this pause, the music stops but does
not end; the binding together of sound into unitary temporal experience
requires this pause, and thus there can only be an ending in the sense of
coming to fruition when there is an appropriately timed pause which, as
the ending of the piece, is as integral to the experience as any note sounded
within it.17 The appropriate duration is dictated by the mental reverberation
required by binding the experience, not by a physical echo which may be
present. It is likely that a haunting piece which trails off into a lonely and
hopeless pianissimo would require a longer pause before applause than a
louder piece with less emotional depth, even if the latter is performed in a
very live room and the former in a more muted space. Unlike the physical
reverberations of the echo, the mental reverberation of retentional meaning-binding in the pause grows louder as the pause extends. Or, at least, up
to a certain point—certainly the pause can be too long, at which point the
listener has fi nished attending to what has just been heard and has become
distracted by other events, or the silence ceases to retain what came before
and begins to protend what is about to occur. In the concert hall, we await
the drop of the conductor’s baton, and at some point we are no longer still
‘listening’ to the now-absent music but begin instead to think, “What’s
going on? Should I clap? Maybe it isn’t over yet . . .”
In order to properly bring sentences, paragraphs, and chapters to fruition, the narrator of an audiobook must similarly pause for the right
amount of time and do so for the same reasons. Should the pause be too
short, comprehension is inhibited and the listener becomes confused or disengaged. Like the conductor holding her hand aloft, the narrator can signal
to the audience not to move on, not to be distracted, and not to stop paying
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attention. For this reason, it may be that audiobooks have special value
to offer to poetry, for readers may have difficulty lingering properly over
phrases, and the audiobook forces an appropriate reflective duration (even
if the reflection itself does not always take place). As Nick Piombino put
it, “[T]he aural ellipses of the contemporary poem ensure that there will
be spaces for invention on the part of the listener. . . . this is all the more
important in contemporary life where there is so much talking and so little
listening.”18 When we read the written poem, we are ‘talking’ and ‘listening’ to our ‘inner voice,’ and unless we make a serious effort to internally
perform the poem, it is very easy to fail to hear the poem at all. Having the
poetic work performed provides a structure to support the listener’s active
listening: she must wait, and she may then be more likely to wonder and
protend and reflect. This effect extends to poetic and dramatic passages in
prose works as well.
Surely, here too the pause can be too long. We are trained by radio to be
bewildered by “dead air” in a way that we are not in the concert hall, and
when there is any somewhat long pause, we begin to be distracted by our
surroundings or to ask whether the track has ended, whether something has
gone wrong with the playback, or whether it’s time to insert the next CD.
Here, the amount which can be carefully and precisely covered within a
single book chapter is at an end. In order to make some attempt at appropriately broad coverage of the chapter’s topic, as previously mentioned, I
will make some briefer and more informal commentaries on other aspects
of a phenomenology of audiobooks.
Thus far, we have seen how listening to an audiobook requires a listening which binds together past, present, and future in an active construction
of meaning. This process, while immensely complicated, is one to which we
are well accustomed from its similarity to communication with a present
other. We have also seen how pauses and intonations strongly aid comprehension of complex written prose, not necessarily intended to be read
aloud, even when the affordances of the written page are removed.
Taken together, we might expect these aspects of audiobook listening to
result in a displacing or entrancing experience. There is much work to do
and attention demanded, and there is a flow of future with past into present
which follows no rhythm but its own—and all of this is superimposed onto
a visual field and embodied interactions related to the auditory world of the
audiobook in only the most accidental and arbitrary way. This overall depiction of audiobook listening is already implied by what we have discussed to
this point in the chapter, but the following will lend it further support.
3. THE AUDIOBOOK HAS A SPEAKER
The audiobook is a performance, and both the performance and the performer contribute much to the listening experience. But what exactly is part
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of the experience is not as clear as it might seem and depends on the listener
as well as the performer. As Ihde has noted,
in a highly concentrated “narrow” focus I get certain sounds in the
other’s speech but may fi nd it almost impossible to note what was said;
and contrarily in a “broader” focus, as in attending to what is being
said, I may miss or barely be aware of the aspirated s which is characteristic of the other’s speaking style.19
Professional audiobook narrators are selected for their ability to perform
with either a neutral or content-appropriate accent, in which the goal,
presumably, is to minimize the likelihood that the listener’s focus will be
drawn by these formal aspects of the performance rather than by the content which it is meant to represent. Authors who narrate their own works
seem to be coached in the expected style.
The free recordings available online at LibriVox give us an opportunity to see whether and to what extent such formal variances influence our
listening; LibriVox audiobooks are recorded by volunteers, and anybody
with any kind of voice or accent may choose to record any public-domain
work. 20 Although other listeners disagree, I have personally never found it
distracting to hear P. G. Wodehouse performed with an American accent
and see no reason why the Southern American accent should be limited to
Southern genre pieces rather than, for example, a history of England or the
Christian Bible. 21 Listening to Kirsten Ferreri’s recording of sections from
The Antichrist on LibriVox was strange to me at fi rst, but, in less than a
minute, I noticed that I was no longer listening to a woman reading Nietzsche but was instead listening simply to Nietzsche. Alternately, listening
to Gesine’s recording of Schopenhauer’s Über die Weiber did not produce
the same transparency—that a woman had chosen to voice Schopenhauer’s
most misogynist essay reminds the listener of the performer’s presence as a
mute agent behind the voice, and the performer’s active personal silence in
the verbatim production of words which she must clearly disavow makes the
materiality of her voice productively obstructive rather than transparent.
Some narrators purposefully add distinctive vocal characteristics as
an attempt to highlight and enhance content—”doing voices,” as for
example with Jim Dale’s award-winning narration of J. K. Rowling’s
Harry Potter books. In some cases the “voices” are simply a binding
together and representation of the content already within the written
word; in other cases the “voices” are more a creative superaddition supplying new content.
Altogether, the voice itself may be present in three primary ways: counterpunctual, consonant, and dissonant. It may be present as a representation and enhancement of content, much as a counterpoint supports a
melody while creating new content in accordance with its form. It may be
present although transparent, fading into the background of the listener’s
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experience, allowing the listener to focus simply on the content, much as
consonant notes accompany and harmonize with a melody, simply drawing out what is already in it. Or, it may be present in an obstructive form,
whether in a purposeful and productive form, as in the example above of
Gesine’s Schopenhauer, or in an accidental and purely disruptive form, as
might be the case with a title that has poor recording quality or a vocal
characteristic which the listener is for some reason unable to allow to fade
into the background. In either case, the voice is similar to dissonant notes
which clash against and sour a melody—interesting and deepening the
experience when this is the intended effect but less so when unintended or
poorly done.
These three modes of interaction between form and content—counterpunctual, consonant, and dissonant—apply to physical and social contexts
of listening as well. Listening to poetry on one’s iPod may be given a strong
counterpoint by walking through woods; may be simply consonant with
driving, allowing the experience of the road to fade away into the background; and may be dissonant with the commuter crowd, either in a surreal
and interesting manner or in a manner simply annoying and distracting.
4. THE AUDIOBOOK IS STARTED,
STOPPED, AND RESTARTED
The listener must initiate the process of playback when listening to an
audiobook, at which time the vocal performance follows its own predetermined schedule. The driver or the walker must plan ahead for the intended
overlapping of experiences not only through the presence of audio fi les,
with an appropriately integrated technological system of converting these
files to sound waves, but also through the initiation of playback prior to the
intended experiential convergence. The listener may experience frustration
in starting playback in medias res, fumbling through CDs at a red light or
trying to navigate MP3 directories while keeping pace.
If the driver does not specifically start and stop audiobooks but simply
uses the powering on and off of the stereo as a stop and start button, the
activity of driving is fully enclosed within playback: playback resumes
upon starting the engine, and the driver must fi rst attune to the audiobook, then turn to the road, and, once the driving process is complete,
the playback continues until it too is halted. The walker, too, has experiences akin to these “driveway moments,” in which the walker may continue on the exercise machine past the end of a planned amount of time
or distance, waiting for an opportune and hard-to-anticipate moment of
narrative resolution.
In the great majority of cases, the duration of playback is far longer than
the duration of activities engaged in along with playback. The audiobook
might reside in the driver’s car or the walker’s MP3 player for several weeks
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and be played back over many commutes or exercise sessions. For this reason, along with those in the preceding paragraphs, it is appropriate to say
that listening forms the context in which the driving and walking occur
rather than the other way around. In Merleau-Ponty’s visual terminology,
the listening is the figure, and the driving or walking is the background.
This conclusion may sound strange: we more often speak of listening to an
audiobook while driving than of driving while listening to an audiobook.
Still, this inversion is well supported by other common experiences: for
example, that audiobooks may be most often listened to while on daily
commutes or long road trips, situations in which little attention to the road
is needed. It seems, further, that the very purpose of many who listen to
audiobooks while at the gym—I suspect nearly everyone who does so—is
precisely to move the process of exercise into the background in order to
undergo it without so distinctly experiencing it. And thus the audiobook
forms a context for physical and social experience rather than being experienced within a physical and social context.
Michael Bull has made observations in support of this point:
Listening frees up the eyes to observe and imagine, thus differing from
the traditional reading of a book, in which the reader is visually engaged
in the text. . . . The text becomes a continuous flow of sound on to which
he adds a level of physicality in the act of imagination. The sound print
of the book is imposed on the silence of the world around him.22
In the case considered here, the audiobook listener looks around a café,
imagining that the people present are characters in the text. Clearly, there
are many other ways that listening to an audiobook will condition physical
and social experiences, depending upon the kind of listening involved and
the kind of environment in which that listening takes place.
Ihde has discussed the orienting role of the background rhythms of
nature and of the technosphere—the bird calls which signal the time of
day, the hum of fluorescent bulbs which provide a context for paperwork. 23
When I plug my ears, I remove this context and its cues, and I replace them
with auditory events occurring in a different environment and a different
space. It may be that I am to some subconscious extent aware of the contours of that absent space to which I am listening in some dim shadow of
the resonances made clear by composer Alvin Lucier’s classic I Am Sitting
in a Room—at least, I am aware that it is a space different from the one
in which I am embodied and navigate, for it does not change its direction
when I turn my head, nor does it fade as a I walk, or change its resonance
as I move from one room to another or go outside. In both time and space,
the audiobook offers us an alternate and independent world that is literally experienced, without even considering the more metaphorical ‘otherworldly’ effects of narrative and imagination.
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5. THE AUDIOBOOK FORMS A CONTEXT OF
PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL EXPERIENCE
Some time ago, I walked through the grounds of the Bergianska trädgården
in Stockholm while listening to a recording of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s
essay “Self-Reliance.” Was one part of this experience supposed to enhance
the other? Why is this “romantic” to say so? My memory of listening to
Peter Kropotkin’s Conquest of Bread associated with the woods around
a particular stretch of Interstate 77 is no less distinct, nor is my memory
of listening to William Sangster’s Umbrellas and Their History while in a
grocery store parking lot. Surely these moments cannot stand out in my
mind due to any substantive connection between the physical experience
and content of the audio context in which that experience occurred.
Less memorable is my experience of listening to David Hume’s Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding while on the elliptical and the exercise cycle, not because there was less of a connection, or less of interest to
remember from the book, but instead due to an excess of familiarity. I have
met both Hume’s text and the elliptical in different circumstances, and I can
easily think of Hume without the gym coming to mind—but when I return
to Emerson, the Bergianska trädgården comes along with it, as I have (as
Hume would have put it) made them contiguous in my experience without
diluting that contiguity through a multiplicity of other unrelated associations. “Custom,” as Hume said, “is the great guide of human life.”24
Certainly, as Bull has noted, audiobook listening changes the way we
perceive our social environment. 25 To his example of the listener sitting
in the café, we might add the listener who watches the bustle of crowds
and the listener among the bustle of a crowd; the listener seated on public
transit; the listener in the corner store or supermarket. As noted above,
these experiences may be counterpunctual, consonant, or dissonant with
the audiobook which provides their context. The difference, it seems to me,
may depend on the interpretation of the text in which the listener engages
as much as anything else. It is not just one thing to listen to Jane Austen on
the subway.
Regardless of how the social environment is experienced by the listener,
it is clear that the listener is in some kind of disconnection with the social
environment, experiencing it within a context not available to others in
that environment. If the context for being-with-others is supplied via earbuds, whatever experience of community the listener has must be a kind of
false or imaginary community—a public space interpreted as a private and
interior event. And yet the listener is also part of a real but nonlocal community, at minimum a community formed by the work itself: the author,
the performer, the listener, and all the other unknown listeners. This community may be indefi nite, where the listener might imagine how others
reacted to, for example, a controversial event within a plot or claim within
a nonfiction work. This community may be well defi ned, as when a listener
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has picked up an audiobook on the basis of its bestseller status, was lent it
by friends or family, or was recommended it by Oprah Winfrey.
And so here we see three kinds of community within the seemingly
solitary and solitude-seeking act of listening to an audiobook in public: a
real but nonlocal community which is formed around the aesthetic work;
a local but imaginary community within the listener’s privately contextualized experience of others; and a real and local but unexperienced community of audially unavailable mere presence-with others.
There are many further questions which a full phenomenology would
address—in the preceding discussion I hope to have provided a solid start
to such a phenomenology, along with a sketch of its contours. We have seen
that the experience of an audiobook requires active binding of past, present, and future; requires us to construct a timeline separate from that of our
physical interactive world; is constructed and bears authoritative expressions akin to written text; is personal and bears emotional attunement akin
to spoken word; contains demanding and challenging silences; is borne by
a voice which is counterpunctual, consonant, or dissonant; forms a context
for physical and social experience; can be used to fade embodied experience
into background; binds memory in ways very different from written text,
due to the simultaneous experience of an arbitrarily related visual field; and
produces unusual forms of isolation-in-community.
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